We consider a contract manufacturer who procures multiple components from independent suppliers to produce an assemble-to-order customized product for a client. The unit price of the product depends on the manufacturer's delivery lead time. We explore how the manufacturer can use a "Vendor Managed Consignment Inventory (VMCI)" scheme to manage the underlying risk and coordinate independent suppliers' decisions on the production quantities of their components under demand uncertainty. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game played by the manufacturer against her component suppliers to determine her pricing policy for suppliers' consignment inventories. This game embeds a sub-game played by the component suppliers against each other to choose their individual production quantities. We show that while numerous equilibria may exist for the suppliers' sub-game, there is always a unique one that is Pareto-optimal. We develop an efficient algorithm for finding suppliers' Pareto-optimal equilbrium and then derive manufacturer's optimal pricing scheme. Our results provide useful insights for managing components in these types of assemble-to-order environments and for understanding how demand uncertainty and component procurement lead times affect individual firms' performance in decentralized assembly channels.
Introduction
Contract manufacturers, especially those in the computer and consumer electronics industries, must be able to react to a dynamic market and deliver their products in the most cost-effective and timely manner in order to succeed in today's competitive environment. Effective management of component inventory is an important success factor for these contract manufacturers, as cost of components constitutes a significant portion of their total product cost and component availability determines their delivery time performance. Consequently, "procurement professionals at contract manufacturing firms increasingly are turning to distributors [suppliers] for supply chain solutions.
Buyers, especially electronics buyers in the build-to-order mode, are turning increasingly to distributors for such tasks as inventory management, bonded and consignment inventory programs, parts flow control, logistics management, and assorted supplier research and management input. They look to distributors not only to provide products, but also to help them streamline the entire supply chain to reduce cycle times, minimize inventory costs, or provide other competitive advantage, as the next wave of major services offered by leading electronic-component distributors" (Roos 2002 ). "As per a benchmark report by the Aberdeen group, 84% respondents at companies with more than $1 billion revenue said they have their suppliers manage their inventories for them; and additionally, two-thirds of mid-market respondents followed the same concept" (Pinto 2005 ).
In many cases, VMI is implemented with consignment inventory, whereby a supplier is not paid for his delivered inventory until his goods are actually used. "Move to consignment inventory has a long history as an inventory management/cost reduction technique, and it is still among the most popular" (Secton 2003 ). Purchasing's top 50 survey finds that 36 out of these 50 firms provide consignment inventory services (Purchasing Staff 2000) . A recent industry survey further shows that firms in the manufacturing sector are more likely than those in the retail sector to ask their suppliers for consignment arrangements when implementing VMI (Murphy 2004 (Reilly 2000) , and Cascades Resources (Bolch 2005) , to name a few. Cited benefits of these programs range widely from reduced supply chain inventory cost and procurement lead times to improved sales revenue, profit, and customer satisfaction.
In this paper, we refer to the arrangement that combines VMI and consignment inventory as "Vendor Managed Consignment Inventory (VMCI)". With the increasing popularity of VMCI, especially among contract manufacturers, our goal is to analyze the impact of such a program on the performance of contract manufacturers and their component suppliers operating in an assemble-toorder setting with time-dependent product prices and uncertain demand. Under VMCI, component suppliers (vendors) make production decisions and control the component inventory on consignment at the contract manufacturer' site, and are paid by the contract manufacturer only after their components are actually used.
We consider the following specific business setting. 1 A contract manufacturer is anticipating some future order for an assemble-to-order customized product from a major client such as an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). This assemble-to-order product requires multiple components, and each of these components is produced by an independent supplier with a different procurement lead time. The client has provided the contract manufacturer with a demand forecast and the detailed product specification at an early stage, but can only confirm the actual order quantity at some later time. The contract manufacturer is responsible for procuring all the required components for the product and deals directly with these component suppliers.
We assume that product price is time-sensitive. Timely delivery is essential, and any delay of a shipment can reduce the unit price that the contract manufacturer will receive from her client for the assembled product. In such an environment, the contract manufacturer might decide to stock some components ahead of the actual order commitment in order to achieve timely delivery, especially when the procurement lead times for those components are long. On the other hand, such a decision also poses significant risk to the contract manufacturer as component obsolescence could be severe, especially for high technology products. Unused components could be subject to severe price erosion when the client's order falls short of expectations.
Faced with demand uncertainty, component obsolescence, and long procurement lead times, the contract manufacturer can develop strategic partnerships with independent component suppliers and rely on some collaborative arrangements to mitigate the risk in managing her component inventory. In particular, we consider the use of a VMCI program as a partnership between the contract manufacturer and her component suppliers.
2 Using VMCI, the manufacturer can pass on the risk of component overstocking to individual suppliers. However, to entice the suppliers to produce the appropriate amounts of components for timely delivery before the actual order quantity is confirmed, the contract manufacturer needs to devise an effective pricing scheme for the component suppliers.
In this paper, we develop a mathematical model to analyze the performance of a VMCI program
in which the contract manufacturer specifies a pricing scheme for her component suppliers and each supplier then makes his own decision in producing the required components. Under this arrangement, each supplier needs to manage his own risk of producing excessive components, taking into account the pricing scheme and the production quantities of other component suppliers.
Specifically, we formulate the above situation as a two-stage optimization problem. Using a game-theoretical framework, we first analyze the equilibrium component production quantities of the suppliers for any given pricing scheme specified by the contract manufacturer. (We shall refer to the contract manufacturer as the assembler in our subsequent discussions.) We call this the supplier problem. We show that while numerous equilibria may exist for the supplier problem, there always exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium solution. We further devise an efficient algorithm for finding this Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Using the result of the supplier problem, we then analyze the optimal pricing scheme that maximizes the expected profit of the assembler. We call this the assembler problem. Under some mild condition on the demand distribution function, we show that there exists a unique optimal solution to the assembler problem and develop a simple algorithm to find this unique optimal pricing scheme. Furthermore, we derive some analytical results that illustrate how different cost parameters of the model can affect the optimal solution of the assembler problem and the corresponding equilibrium solution of the supplier problem.
Our results reveal several interesting insights and practical implications for managing component inventory using VMCI. First, our results show that a lead time or cost reduction of any individual supplier, while beneficial to the assembler and other suppliers, does not necessarily benefit this individual supplier. This result implies that the assembler needs to provide some incentive for the suppliers to reduce their lead times or component costs. Second, our results show that it is actually desirable for the suppliers to inflate their lead times or component costs. This result implies that it is important for the assembler to devise effective mechanisms to ensure that the suppliers would reveal their true lead times and component costs. Third, while the objective of VMCI is to allow the assembler to share the underlying risk due to demand uncertainty, it is still most beneficial for the assembler to reduce the demand uncertainty in order to maximize her expected profit. Furthermore, an increase of demand uncertainty has a more pronounced adverse effect on the performance of the system under VMCI than under a centralized system. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief literature review of related research. In Section 3, we describe the basic model setting and the VMCI scheme used by the assembler to manage component inventory from different suppliers. In Section 4, we formulate and analyze the supplier problem. We show that there always exists a unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium solution for the supplier problem and provide an efficient algorithm for finding this equilibrium. In Section 5, we formulate and analyze the assembler problem. We characterize the optimal pricing scheme and devise a simple algorithm for finding the optimal solution. In Section 6, we derive some analytical results that illustrate how the component costs and procurement lead times can affect the optimal solution. We also provide some numerical results to illustrate how demand variability can affect the system and individual firms' performance. We further give some comparative results between our decentralized system under VMCI and a centralized system. We conclude the paper in Section 7. All mathematical proofs are given in the Appendix.
Literature Review
There exists a substantial body of recent research on assemble-to-order (ATO) systems, which have been widely adopted in practice for achieving mass customization. assembly system with a delivery time-dependent pricing structure. They characterize the structure of the optimal component procurement policy and provide an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal solution. In that paper, the assembler is allowed to deliver the total order quantity in multiple partial shipments. Hsu et al. (2007) extend their earlier model to the case where only one single full shipment is allowed.
All the above papers consider centralized systems where the assembler decides on the stocking quantity. Our paper is more closely related to a recent body of literature studying the competi- ting in which the assembler uses supply contracts to induce independent component suppliers to choose their individual production quantities. However, these papers assume that there is only one chance to order the components to fill a future uncertain demand, which implies that all suppliers will produce the same quantity in equilibrium. This assumption greatly simplifies the underlying decision problems. In contrast, our model allows for multiple deliveries of the final product such that different suppliers, with different component production lead times, may choose to produce different quantities.
Other recent papers studying the competitive nature of decentralized assembly channels include 
The Basic Model
Consider a contract assembler who is anticipating a future order from her client for an assembleto-order customized product. The specific order quantity, denoted by D, is uncertain and can only be confirmed by the client at some future time point, denoted by t 0 . Let f (.) and F (.) be the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of D, respectively. After the actual order quantity is revealed at time t 0 , the assembler can deliver the required products in multiple shipments. However, the assembler will receive a different unit price for the products in each shipment depending on the delivery time of the shipment. The pricing schedule is provided to the assembler, and a longer delivery time will generally result in a lower unit price. 3 The final product consists of n different components. Each component i is produced by an independent supplier at a fixed unit cost of c i , i = 1, 2, .., n. The assembler uses a vendor managed consignment inventory (VMCI) arrangement to coordinate the component production of the n suppliers. Under this arrangement, the assembler first specifies a pricing scheme to pay the suppliers for their components, and the suppliers then choose the individual production quantities of their components. In the following, we delineate how the total sales revenue can depend on the suppliers' production decisions and describe the structure of the assembler's pricing scheme to the component suppliers.
Facing uncertain demand before time t 0 , each supplier i needs to choose an initial production quantity Q i . We assume that all suppliers have sufficient time and capacity to produce this initial quantity before time t 0 . At time t 0 , demand D for the final product is realized. The assembler can thus produce and deliver an initial shipment of min{min i (Q i ), D} units of product to her client.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the assembly time is negligible, so that this initial shipment will be delivered to the client at time t 0 .
If the initial shipment is not sufficient to meet the total demand D due to shortages of one or more of the components, then those suppliers with component shortage will start a second batch of production at time t 0 to satisfy the remaining demand. In particular, supplier i will produce (D − Q i ) + units of component i, where (x) + denotes max(x, 0). An important feature of our model is that the second batch of component production requires different lead times for the different component suppliers. Let L i be the delivery lead time for supplier i, which includes the production and transportation times for shipping the components to the assembler. We number the suppliers
For notational convenience, we also define L 0 = 0.
As soon as the assembler receives the additional batches of components from the suppliers, she will immediately assemble the final products and deliver them to her client in order to capture the highest unit price possible. For example, suppose that Q 1 < min i>1 (Q i ) and Q 1 < D. Then, the assembler is able to deliver Q 1 units of product to her client at time t 0 . Also, the assembler will receive a second batch of (D − Q 1 ) units of components from supplier 1 at time t 0 + L 1 , and immediately assemble and deliver an additional min{D
her client. A graphical illustration of the timeline of events is provided in Figure 1 . Note that there can be at most (n + 1) possible delivery epochs for the products, namely,
While each supplier may need to produce and deliver the components to the assembler in two separate batches, we assume that the unit production costs of the two batches remain the same in our model. This simplifying assumption allows us to focus on the trade-off between the understocking cost of capturing a higher product selling price and the overstocking cost of excess components under uncertain demand. This assumption is reasonable for situations where both batches need to go through the same production and delivery processes and hence incur the same cost.
Recall that there are (n + 1) possible delivery epochs at
.., P n be the corresponding unit product prices received by the assembler.
implying that a longer delivery time results in a lower unit product price. Also, we assume that the assembler uses the following pricing scheme to manage component production with her n component suppliers: supplier i will receive a revenue of P t i for each unit of his component used for delivery at time t 0 + L t . Thus, the assembler needs to determine a VMCI contract, which is fully specified by the pricing matrix {P
To induce each supplier to produce components early so as to achieve early product delivery for a higher product price, the assembler would set P t i to be decreasing in t for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. Also, we assume that each supplier i has a unit reservation price v i (with v i ≥ c i ) such that he will only produce the components if the unit price P t i is at least v i . Thus, any feasible contract must satisfy
for all i = 1, ..., n. The reservation price v i can represent the minimum return that supplier i needs to get for his investment and effort in producing the components. Alternatively, the reservation price can correspond to the regular component price that the supplier can sell in the open market.
We assume that the reservation prices are known to the assembler.
We assume that the product price of the last possible delivery at time t 0 + L n is higher than the total reservation prices of the n suppliers, i.e., P n > n i=1 v i , so that the assembler will always choose to deliver the full order quantity D. Furthermore, we assume that the assembler incurs no cost for assembling and delivering the final product to the client, and there is no salvage value for excess components produced. However, these assumptions can be relaxed without altering the structural properties and insights of the model results.
Our model does not explicitly consider the costs associated with holding components for the suppliers. When component holding costs for suppliers are significant, however, we can easily adapt our model as follows. First, we can include the component holding cost during production and delivery to the assembler in the unit production cost (sometimes called the "landed" cost).
Also, since there is no cost associated with batch sizing or economies of scale, the suppliers can coordinate the component delivery times such that appropriate components arrive only at the decision epochs t 0 + L t where the components will either be immediately used for assembly or salvaged. For example, if a certain amount in the second batch of component 1 is needed for subsequent deliveries at time (t 0 + L i ), supplier 1 can schedule the production of these components at time (t 0 + L i − L 1 ) so that they will arrive at time (t 0 + L i ) and incur no holding cost. We refer to Hsu et al. (2006) for a similar delivery structure. Therefore, the structural properties and insights of the model extend to the case with component holding costs as well.
We model the sequence of the overall decision-making process as a Stackelberg leader-followers' game. The assembler, acting as the leader, moves first to unilaterally specify the pricing scheme
..,n . The component suppliers, acting as the followers, then simultaneously choose their initial production quantities {Q i } i=1,2,...,n . We assume that all information about demand distribution, product prices, production lead times, and costs is common knowledge to all parties.
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For a given pricing scheme chosen by the assembler, the expected profit of any one supplier depends on his own production quantity as well as the production quantities of all other suppliers.
Thus, for a given pricing scheme, the decisions of the n suppliers also constitute a gaming problem, which we refer to as the supplier problem. 
The Supplier Problem
For a given pricing scheme {P
..,n , the n suppliers simultaneously choose the initial production quantities (Q 1 , ..., Q n ) of their individual components. Our first goal is to characterize the structure of the equilibrium production quantities of the n suppliers. For notational convenience,
.., Q n ) with the element Q i omitted. For any given production quantities
chosen by all other suppliers, supplier i chooses his production quantity Q i so as to maximize his expected profit, which can be written as
Let Q * i denote the optimal production quantity of supplier i given Q −i . We can first establish the following result:
Recall that the suppliers are indexed according to their production lead times such that
Proposition 1 states that a supplier will never choose to stock more than any other supplier that has a longer production lead time. This result can be intuitively explained by considering the two suppliers case. If the actual demand D exceeds Q 2 , then any component 1 in excess of Q 2 still needs to wait for the second batch of the component 2 to arrive before the final assembly, resulting in the same revenue as the decision with Q 1 = Q 2 . On the other hand, the
Proposition 1 implies that any Nash equilibrium production quantities (Q 1 , ..., Q n ) must satisfy the following condition:
In view of (3), we can restrict our analysis of the profit function
. Therefore, we only need to
It is important to note that even any equilibrium satisfies (3), supplier i's best response production quantity Q * i does not necessarily satisfy
This is because the quantities assumed here for other suppliers satisfying the necessary condition
. ≤ Q n themselves may not be in equilibrium. Therefore, we need
. In this case,
We next characterize the optimal solution Q * i that maximizes Π i (Q i |Q −i ). Define
SinceF (x) is a decreasing function, it follows from (1) that q
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n. We have the following result. (4) is continuous and strictly concave in
Proposition 2: For any given
(b) the optimal production quantity of supplier i is given by
where
Proposition 2 shows that Q * i must be equal to either one of the q can arrive at time t 0 + L 1 . Thus, the unit understocking cost of supplier 2 in this case is now given
To summarize, equations (3) and (6) provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for which any Nash equilibrium solution of the suppliers' production quantities must satisfy. By solving (3) and (6), we can characterize the equilibrium solutions of the supplier problem.
Proposition 3: (a) Suppose that
The production quantities
. ., n, constitute the unique Nash equilibrium solution of the n-supplier problem.
Proposition 3(a) provides the sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium solution in which supplier i chooses the production quantity of q
characterizes the structure of any equilibrium solution if the above sufficient condition does not hold. In particular, immediate neighboring suppliers will form "clusters" in equilibria, with all members in the same cluster having the same production quantity. We can describe this form of an equilibrium as an m-cluster solution, where the n suppliers are partitioned into m clusters with
Using the results of Proposition 3, we can devise an efficient algorithm for finding a unique m-cluster solution to the n-supplier problem. The algorithm starts by treating each of the n suppliers as a separate cluster. At each iteration, it merges two neighboring clusters into one single cluster until a unique solution is reached. Let l i and r i denote the indexes of the first and last suppliers in cluster i, respectively. Then, an m-cluster solution can be represented as
indicate a quantity that is common for all members in cluster i. For example, we use Q [i] to denote the production quantity of all suppliers in cluster i, i.e.,
can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1 (Finding the n suppliers' unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium)
Step Step 1: For all i = 1, . . ., m, compute
If q i−1
is the m-cluster equilibrium solution of the n-supplier problem and stop. Otherwise, go to step 2.
Step 2: Let k be the smallest index i such that q i−1
. Merge the corresponding clusters k and (k + 1) into one single cluster by setting
Go back to step 1.
We can provide a constructive proof to show that Algorithm 1 finds the unique Pareto-optimal m-cluster equilibrium solution for the n-supplier problem. The basic idea for the proof is as follows.
We first show that every equilibrium point of the m-cluster system formed at each iteration of Algorithm 1 corresponds to an equilibrium point of the original n-supplier problem. We then show that every equilibrium point of the original system not contained in the equilibrium set of this m-cluster system is dominated by an equilibrium point of this m-cluster system in terms of the expected profit of each individual supplier. Since the algorithm always ends up with an m-cluster system with a unique equilibrium solution, this unique equilibrium solution must dominate all other equilibria of the original system. We summarize this result below. i.e., this equilibrium maximizes the expected profit of every supplier among all possible equilibria.
Consequently, we shall consider this equilibrium solution as the outcome of the supplier problem for the remainder of our analysis.
The Assembler Problem
The decision problem for the assembler is to choose the optimal pricing scheme that maximizes her own expected profit, assuming that the n suppliers will choose their equilibrium production quantities given by Algorithm 1. LetP = {P
..,n be any pricing scheme satisfying (1) and Q i (P) be the corresponding equilibrium production quantity of supplier i in response to the pricing
assembler problem is to determine the optimalP so as to maximize her expected profit given by
We note that there may exist multiple pricing schemes that would result in the same m-cluster equilibrium solution as denoted by {(l 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (l m , r m )} with
for all i = 1, 2, ..., m − 1. The following result shows that there always exists a unique pricing scheme that maximizes the expected profit of the assembler among all feasible pricing schemes. (9) , the pricing schemeP maximizing the expected profit of the assembler is given by
Proposition 4: To induce a given m-cluster equilibrium solution with
Proposition 4 shows that the assembler needs to offer a unit risk premium of [
in order to induce supplier k in cluster i to produce Q [i] units of component k before the actual demand is realized. After the actual demand is realized at time t 0 , the assembler should only pay the suppliers their reservation prices for the components, as there is no more risk involved for these second batches of production. Equation (10) provides a one-to-one correspondence between any m-cluster equilibrium solution with (Q [1] , . . . , Q [m] ) for the supplier problem and corresponding optimal pricing schemeP for the assembler problem. Therefore, finding the optimal pricing scheme for the assembler is equivalent to finding the optimal cluster formation {(l 1 , r 1 ), ..., (l m , r m )} with Q = (Q [1] , ..., Q [m] ). By substituting (10) into (8), we can express the expected profit of the assembler as
Since the second term on the right hand side of (11) is independent of the production quantities, we can rewrite the assembler problem as max
The next result provides some structural properties regarding the function M (a,b) (Q). We first
Proposition 5:
) is concave and reaches
its maximum atq (a,b) which solves the equation
Using the results in Proposition 5, we can devise the following simple algorithm to find the optimal pricing scheme for the assembler by determining the corresponding optimal cluster formation and production quantities of the suppliers:
Algorithm 2 (Finding the assembler's optimal policy)
Step 0: (Initialization) Set m = n, r 0 = 0, and
Step 1: (15) and set
The corresponding optimal pricing scheme {P t i } can be found using (10) .
Otherwise, go to step 2.
Step 2:
into a single cluster by setting
Go back to step 1. the demand distribution. Hence, while the optimal production quantity for each cluster depends on the demand distribution, the optimal cluster formation is independent of the demand distribution.
The next result shows that Algorithm 2 indeed finds the optimal pricing scheme for the assembler.
Theorem 2: Assume that R(Q) is increasing in Q. Algorithm 2 finds the unique optimal solution
for the assembler problem (13) .
The assumption that R(Q) is increasing in Q in Theorem 2 is a very weak condition, as discussed by Wang and Gerchak (2003) . For example, this condition is satisfied by all distributions with increasing failure rate (IFR), which include many commonly used distributions such as the Normal and Uniform distributions, as well as the Gamma and Weibull families subject to parameter restrictions (Barlow and Proschan 1965) . We assume that this condition holds for the remainder of this paper.
Managerial Implications
Using (c) all other suppliers' optimal expected profits stay the same, and the system optimal expected profit stays the same.
Proposition 6 shows that any change in the reservation price of a supplier has no effect on the optimal production quantities in the system. Any increase in the reservation price of any individual supplier would simply shift the profit from the assembler to this supplier, without affecting the expected profit of the other suppliers or the system. Thus, whether any supplier chooses to reveal his reservation price would only affect the expected profits of his own and the assembler, but will have no impact on the behavior of the other suppliers and the overall performance of the system.
Component Costs
We next illustrate how a change in component cost c k can affect the optimal solution of the system. Suppose that all model parameters stay the same, except that c k is changed toc k for some 
Proposition 7: Suppose thatc
Proposition 7 shows that a decrease of the component cost c k has no impact on the equilibrium production quantity of the components or the profitability of the suppliers in the lower-indexed clusters than the one containing k, but would increase the equilibrium production quantity of the components in the same cluster containing k or higher-indexed clusters, as well as the expected profits of all other suppliers in these clusters. Also, a decrease in c k increases the expected profits of the assembler and the system. The above result is rather surprising. It shows that while a reduction in the component cost of one supplier would benefit the system as a whole, the assembler, and other suppliers with longer lead times, it might not necessarily benefit this specific supplier. We can explain this observation as follows. A reduction in the production cost of a supplier could potentially increase the profit margin of this supplier and thus increase his production quantity. However, the assembler, acting as the Stackelberg leader, would lower the corresponding price schedule for this supplier and increase those for other suppliers with longer lead times so as to induce these suppliers to produce a higher quantity of their components to go along with the increase in the production quantity of this specific supplier. As such, this specific supplier might not necessarily benefit. This result is consistent with a conclusion derived in Granot and Yin (2004) and Yin (2006) .
Thus, our result implies that it might not always be desirable for a supplier to reduce his component cost (or more precisely, to reveal such cost reduction to the assembler and other suppliers) even as his reservation price stays the same. The supplier needs to carefully consider the underlying cost structure of other suppliers to ensure that his cost reduction would actually benefit himself.
Our result also has some interesting implications for the assembler in selecting component suppliers. For example, our result implies that it is beneficial for the assembler and the longer lead time suppliers to outsource the component production to an alternate supplier in a lower-cost economy. Furthermore, such an outsourcing opportunity would benefit the whole supply chain, as long as this alternate supplier can offer similar delivery time performance.
Component Procurement Lead Times
We next analyze how a change in the component procurement lead time L k can affect the optimal solution. Suppose that all model parameters stay the same, except that L k is changed tõ
so that the order of the lead times remains unchanged. Since the product price P k is determined by the delivery delay L k , a reduction in L k is equivalent to an increase in unit product price
and Π * s denote the optimal equilibrium production quantity of supplier i, and the optimal expected profits of supplier i, the assembler and the system, respectively, for the model with parameter L k .
LetQ * i ,Π * i ,Π * 0 , andΠ * s denote the corresponding values for the model with parameterL k .
Proposition 8: Suppose thatL
Proposition 8 shows that a reduction in the procurement lead time of a supplier would reduce the optimal equilibrium production quantities and the expected profit of all component suppliers with lower lead times, including this supplier, but would increase the optimal equilibrium production quantities and the expected profit of all component suppliers with longer lead times as well as the expected profit of the assembler.
However, it remains unclear as to how a reduction in the procurement lead time of a supplier would affect the total expected profit of the system Π s . It is plausible that the total expected profit would increase due to a higher unit product price associated with a lower lead time. Indeed, we have observed in all our numerical results that ifL k < L k , i.e.,P k > P k , thenΠ s ≥ Π s . However, we are unable to establish an analytical proof for this observation, even for the single supplier case.
To delve further into the impact of procurement lead time on the expected profit of individual suppliers, we consider the special case where all suppliers have the same unit component cost and reservation price, i.e., v 1 = c 1 = v 2 = c 2 = ... = v n = c n . In this case, it is easy to show that
In other words, a supplier with a longer lead time has a higher expected profit than that of a supplier with a shorter lead time. We can explain this observation as follows.
Since it is desirable for suppliers with longer lead times to produce a larger quantity of components than other suppliers with shorter lead times, the assembler would need to provide a larger share of her revenue for the supplier with a longer lead time to motivate this supplier to produce more, resulting in a higher expected profit for this supplier.
An important implication of our result is that there is no incentive for any supplier to unilaterally reduce his component procurement lead time under the VMCI program. Instead, a longer procurement lead time actually becomes a strategic leverage for a supplier to increase his own expected profit. Our result also implies that the suppliers have the incentive to inflate their procurement lead times so as to increase their share of profits from the assembler. Therefore, the assembler needs to devise an effective mechanism to entice the suppliers to reveal their true procurement lead times. Furthermore, the assembler should be more inclined to search for alternative suppliers if these long lead time suppliers fail to improve their delivery time performance.
By the same token, our result implies that the assembler needs to exercise great caution in choosing component suppliers or outsourcing the component production to low-cost economies. A longer delivery lead time from an outsourcing partner could easily outweigh the potential benefits of a lower production cost offered by such a partner.
Demand Uncertainty
Demand uncertainty is another major factor that affects the behavior of the assembler and the suppliers. We here provide some results from our numerical experiments to illustrate the impact of demand uncertainty. Specifically, consider the following 6-component example with
. Also, assume that the demand D is normally distributed with mean μ = 1000 and standard deviation σ, with σ varying from 50 to 150. For this example, the optimal cluster formation is given by {(1, 2), (3, 5), (6, 6)}. (As noted earlier, the optimal cluster formation is independent of the underlying demand distribution.) We summarize the expected profits of the individual suppliers, the assembler and the system for different values of σ in Table 1 . Observe from Table 1 that as the demand variability σ increases, the expected profits of all suppliers increase, while the expected profits of the assembler and the system decrease. This observation also holds for our other numerical experiments.
Our results show that since the suppliers bear the full risk of over-production of their individual components under the VMCI program, they require a higher component price premium in order to compensate for the increased underlying risk due to the higher demand uncertainty. Consequently, the expected profits of all suppliers increase, while the expected profits of the assembler and the system decrease as demand uncertainty increases. Thus, our result implies that while one main objective of a VMCI program is to allow the assembler to share the underlying risk due to demand uncertainty with her component suppliers, it is still beneficial for the assembler to reduce the demand uncertainty.
Decentralized System Versus Centralized System
In our decentralized system, the assembler first specifies the pricing scheme and each supplier then chooses his individual production quantities of components, with all players maximizing their own individual expected profits. In contrast to the decentralized system, we can consider a centralized system in which the assembler makes all procurement decisions. Alternatively, we may interpret the centralized system as the case where all suppliers and the assembler belong to the same firm. Proposition 9 shows that the suppliers have the same cluster formation under the two systems.
However, the component production quantities in a centralized system are strictly larger than their counterparts in the decentralized system. This implies that more products will be assembled and delivered earlier under the centralized system than under the decentralized system. Proposition 9
further shows that the total expected profit of the centralized system is always higher than that of the decentralized system. This benefit is due to the elimination of double marginalization as well as the inefficiency caused by the horizontal interactions among independent suppliers under a decentralized decision. Finally, we provide some numerical results to illustrate the impact of demand uncertainty on both the centralized and decentralized systems. Table 2 summarizes the results for the same 6-component example provided in Table 1 . Observe from Table 2 that the expected profits of both the centralized and decentralized systems decrease as the demand uncertainty σ increases. However, the decrease in the expected profit of the decentralized system is more severe than that of the centralized system. In other words, increased demand uncertainty tends to harm the decentralized system more than the centralized system in terms of the total expected profit of the system. We observe similar results in our other numerical experiments.
Conclusion
We study the optimal procurement strategy for an assembler who uses multiple components from independent suppliers to assemble a customized product for her client. The exact order quantity is uncertain and can only be confirmed by the client at some future time point. Timely delivery is essential, and any delay of product shipment will result in a reduced unit price received by the assembler. The assembler uses a vendor managed consignment inventory (VMCI) scheme to contract with her component suppliers. Under the VMCI scheme, the assembler specifies a pricing scheme for her component suppliers, and each supplier then makes his own decision in producing the required components. We model the system as a two-stage optimization problem.
Using a game-theoretical framework, we analyze the equilibrium component production quantities of the suppliers and devise an efficient algorithm for finding the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium solution. We then analyze the assembler problem and develop a simple algorithm to find the optimal pricing scheme that maximizes the expected profit of the assembler. Finally, we derive some sensitivity results that illustrate how different model parameters can affect the optimal solution of the assembler and the corresponding equilibrium solution of the suppliers.
Our analytical results reveal several interesting insights on how component costs and procurement lead times affect individual firms' performance under a vendor managed consignment inventory scheme. We show that a reduction of the lead time or production cost by an individual supplier, while beneficial to the assembler and the entire system, does not necessarily increase the expected profit of this individual supplier. This implies that there is no incentive for any individual supplier to unilaterally reduce his lead time or cost. Consequently, it is important for the assembler to provide some incentive for the suppliers to reduce their lead times or component costs, as both reductions benefit the assembler. Our results further suggest that it is actually desirable for the suppliers to inflate their lead times or component costs. As such, it is also important for the assembler to devise effective mechanisms that would result in the suppliers revealing their true lead times and component costs under the VMCI scheme studied in this paper. These results also provide some practical implications for the assembler in selecting component suppliers.
Our numerical results also show that increased demand uncertainty benefits the component suppliers, but has an adverse effect on the assembler and the overall system. This implies that while the objective of the VMCI scheme is to allow the assembler to share the underlying risk of the system due to demand uncertainty with the component suppliers, it is still beneficial for the assembler to reduce the underlying demand uncertainty. On the other hand, the component supplier can demand a higher price premium for components as demand uncertainty increases. Furthermore, an increase of demand uncertainty has a more pronounced adverse effect on the performance of the decentralized system under VMCI than on the performance of the centralized system. Finally, we briefly address two modeling issues that deserve further attention. First, our model assumes that all information about reservation prices, production lead times, and costs are common knowledge to all parties. In many situations where it would be more realistic to allow individual players to hold private information (or not to reveal their true information), it is worthy to study the effective coordination schemes to manage the assembler-suppliers relationship under such settings. Second, our model assumes that once the actual demand is realized, a supplier will produce and deliver his second batch of components at his reservation price. This assumption is reasonable in situations where the reservation price essentially represents the market price at which the assembler can procure these components from other alternative sources or in situations where the assembler and supplier are engaged in a long-term relationship for other business transactions. Otherwise, there exists the possibility that the supplier would decide to hold up the delivery of his second batch of components in order to negotiate a better price. Taking this behavior into account would likely alter the optimal pricing scheme specified by the assembler. This issue remains to be explored, and to this end, one might be able to draw from the bargaining framework of Nagarajan and Bassok (2004) . 
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Observe that for
and the summation term in (2) can be written as
.., Q n ). This implies that the optimal Q * i must be less than or equal to min(Q i+1 , ..., Q n ). q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) We can express Π
and
Furthermore, solving
It remains to check the property on the breaking points Q j for j = 1, 2, ..., i − 1. First, it follows directly from (4) that, for j = 1, 2, ..., i − 1,
is continuous at each of these breaking points. Furthermore,
This proves (a).
(b) There are three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases for the value of right-hand side of (6): 1) q
We shall show that in each of these three cases, the value of right-hand side of (6) maximizes
In this case, since q j i is decreasing in j and Q j is increasing in j, we must have
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) We first show that the solution
satisfies (3) and (6), and thus is a Nash equilibrium. Since q (3) is clearly satisfied. To prove (6), we need to show that, for all i = 1, 2, ..., n,
By assumption, q
and so max(q
by assumption. Therefore, (19) holds.
To show that the equilibrium is unique, we further demonstrate that Q i = q for all i = 1, . . . , n, which implies that
where the last equality follows from the fact that max(Q j , q
is decreasing in j. Using (20) for i = n, we haveQ n = q n−1 n . Using (20) repeatedly from i = n − 1
for all i.
(b) Using (6) for suppliers i and i + 1, we havẽ
Assume thatQ i <Q i+1 . It follows from (22) thatQ i+1 ≤ max(Q i , q i i+1 ), which implies that
. It then follows from (3) that
From (21) and (23), we havẽ
i . This leads to the fact that
≥Q i+1 , contradicting the assumption thatQ i <Q i+1 . Therefore, we prove that 
Proof of
where q r j a is defined in (5) . Note that for all i = 1, . . ., m, q 0
. In view of (3) and (6), we define an equilibrium solution of the m-cluster system defined above, (Q [1] , Q [2] , ..., Q [m] ), as satisfying the following two equations:
For the m-cluster system, any equilibrium solution
) must therefore satisfy the following equilibrium conditions as given by (24)- (26) and
In step (24)- (26) with (27)- (30) and thus is an equilibrium solution of the m-cluster system. Clearly, (31)- (32) imply (27)- (28) . Since
it follows from (35) that for all j = 0, 1, ..., k − 1,
In conjunction with the condition of q 
Hence, (34) (27)- (30) . From (27)- (28) and (30), it is straightforward to see that Q m−1 also satisfies (31)- (32) and (34) . Also, (29) implies that
Then, it follows from (36) and
Since by assumption that Q m−1 is not an equilibrium of the (m − 1)-cluster system, we must have 
Then,Q m−1 satisfies (31)- (34), and thus is an equilibrium of the (m−1)-cluster system. Proposition A1 implies that its corresponding m-cluster solution, denoted byQ m , is also an equilibrium solution of the m-cluster system.
To complete the proof, all we need is to show thatQ m dominates Q m . To that end, we can first rewrite the profit function of supplier i given in (2), for any Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) with
Observe thatQ m
Therefore, for all i < l k or i > r k+1 ,
It is easy to verify that the function
is concave in Q and reaches its maximum atF (25) and (37), we havē
where the equality follows from the definition of r k−1 = l k − 1. Therefore, (1) and (5) imply that
This implies that 
satisfies (9) . Therefore, the pricing scheme (10) induces the equilibrium solution (Q [1] , . . . , Q [m] )
under Algorithm 1.
To show that the pricing scheme given by (10) 
First, it is obvious from (1) and (10) that for any i = 1, . . . , m and l i ≤ k ≤ r i , we have
Furthermore, it follows from (10) that (5) and (9) that
From the above two equations and the fact thatF −1 (x) is decreasing in x, we have P 0 k ≤P
as both P 
Proof of Proposition 5:
Direct differentiations of (12) give
Since R(Q) is increasing in Q, we have
dR(Q) dQ
≥ 0, which implies that
is concave, and its maximumq (a,b) is given by
= 0, which is equivalent to (15) .
q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Observe that the assembler problem (13) has the same structure as the optimal component procurement problem studied in Hsu et al. (2006) , which can be expressed as 
We can interpret the first two terms in (39) as the expected profit (or risk premium) generated from stocking Q i components ahead of demand, while the last term represents the risk-free expected profit. Also, the expected profit of the assembler as given in (11) can be written as
It follows directly from (40) that the optimal production quantities for the assembler are not affected by any of the reservation prices, v i , ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(b) Since the optimal production quantities for the assembler are not affected by any of the reservation prices, the result follows directly from (39) and (40) .
(c) Using (39) and (40), the total expected profit of the suppliers and assembler is given by
It is clear from (39) and (41) that increasing the reservation price of any individual supplier will not change the expected profit of the other suppliers and the system. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 7:
(a) Since the optimal production quantities are independent of the reservation prices from Proposition 6, we can directly apply the proof of Proposition 6 in Hsu et.al (2006) to establish the desired result, and we omit the details here.
(b) From (39), we obtain
Since Π i , ∀i = k is independent ofc k , the result follows from part (a).
(c) It follows from (40) andc k < c k thatΠ 0 (Q * ) > Π 0 (Q * ). SinceQ * is optimal for the n-component system with parameterc k , we haveΠ 0 (Q * ) ≥Π 0 (Q * ). Hence,Π 0 (Q * ) ≥Π 0 (Q * ) > Π 0 (Q * ).
Consider any equilibrium solution Q = (Q 1 , ..., Q n ) forming m clusters { (l 1 , r 1 ) , ..., (l m , r m )}.
Let (Q [1] , Q [2] , ..., Q [m] ) denote the corresponding equilibrium production quantity for each cluster,
i.e., Q * a = Q [i] for all l i ≤ a ≤ r i and i = 1, ..., m. We can then express the total expected profit of the system given by (41) as
Using (15) and (16) in Proposition 5, the quantity Q [j] satisfies
+ R(Q [j] ).
Substituting the above equation into Π s (Q), we obtain
which is independent of any c i . Define
Differentiating H j (Q) with respect to Q yields
Since R(Q) is increasing in Q, H j (Q) > 0 for any Q. Hence, it follows from the result of part (a)
that H j (Q * j ) ≥ H j (Q * j ) for all j = 1, .., n. Consequently,Π s (Q * ) ≥ Π s (Q * ).
To establish the strict inequality, it suffices to show thatQ * j = Q * j , which implies that there exists some i such thatQ * i > Q * i . IfQ * j and Q * j do not have the same cluster formation, then the result is trivial. Assume that they have the same cluster formation. Sincec k < c k , equation (16) implies that the cluster containing supplier k have a strictly higher production quantity under the system with parameterc k than that with c k . This completes the proof. 
the optimal solution to (13) (b) Differentiating (39) with respect to Q i yields
Since c i stays the same for all i = 1, ..., n, it follows from the result of part (a) thatΠ * i ≤ Π * i for all
(c) It follows from (40) that
where for notational convenience, define Q * n+1 ≡ ∞. SinceQ * is optimal for the n-component system with parameterP k , we haveΠ 0 (Q * ) ≥Π 0 (Q * ). Hence,Π 0 (Q * ) ≥Π 0 (Q * ) > Π 0 (Q * ).
q.e.d. . Also, it follows from Proposition 5 that the optimal production quantity in the decentralized system 
Proof of Proposition
